John A. Lyon v. Dr. Donald W. Bryan, M.D., : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
John A. Lyon v. Dr. Donald W. Bryan, M.D., : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David H. Epperson; David C. Epperson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Savage, Yeates & Waldron; E. Scott Savage; Kyle C. Thompson; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lyon v. Bryan, No. 20100006 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2109
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN A. LYON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD W. BRYAN, M.D., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20100006-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT AND DENIAL OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING 
David H. Epperson 
David C. Epperson 
EPPERSON & OWENS 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Kyle C. Thompson (11242) 
170 South Main, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellant 
« » « APPELLATE COURTS 
Hto J 0 2011 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN A. LYON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DR. DONALD W. BRYAN, M.D., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
David H. Epperson 
David C. Epperson 
EPPERSON & OWENS 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Appellate Case No. 20100006-CA 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Kyle C.Thompson (11242) 
170 South Main, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellant 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT AND DENIAL OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
L The Denial of Mr. Lyon's Motion for New Trial Should Be 
Reversed 1 
A. Dr. Bryan's Suggestion that a Plaintiff Cannot 
Prevail on an Appeal of a Trial Court Denial of a 
Motion for New Trial Due to Insufficiency of the 
Evidence Has No Basis in Utah Law 2 
B. Dr. Bryan Does Not Point to Any Evidence Supporting 
the Jury Verdict; His Argument Is Limited to a 
Defense of the Trial Court's Improper Speculation 2 
C. Dr. Serfustini's Testimony Is Not the Sort of 
Uncontroverted Testimony that Simply Can Be 
Disbelieved 7 
1. The Homer and Glauser Cases Cited by Dr. Bryan 
Are Readily Distinguishable and Inapplicable . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
2. The Jury Could Not Have Disregarded Dr. Serfustini's 
Testimony and Obeyed the Jury Instructions 8 
D. The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion for New Trial 
Should Not Be Upheld on the Theory that the Jury 
Based Its Verdict of Negligence on Some Speculative 
"Alternative Basis" 12 
1. If the Jury Found Dr. Bryan Negligent on Some 
Basis Other than His Failure to Diagnose and 
Treat Mr. Lyon, then It Ignored the Jury 
Instructions 13 
2. The Record Does Not Support Dr. Bryan's Theory 
that the Finding of Negligence Was Based on 
Something Other than Dr. Bryan's Failure to 
Diagnose and Treat Mr. Lyon . 15 
II. This Court is Free to Independently Review the Jury's Verdict 17 
i 
A. An Independent Review of the Verdict Would Not 
"Disrespect" the Trial Court 17 
B. There Is No Procedural Bar to an Independent 
Review of the Verdict 18 
C. Ortiz Is Directly on Point and Dispositive of this Appeal 19 
CONCLUSION .21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Berven v. Gardner, 414 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1969) 10 
Brown v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970) 1, 3, 5 
Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1964) 10 
Chatelain v. Thackeray, 100 P.2d 191 (Utah 1940) 1, 9,15 
Combs v. Gardner, 382 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1967) 10 
Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141,27 P.3d 565 7, 8 
Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 7, 8 
Hyland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 427 P.2d 736 (Utah 1967) 3 
King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) 17 
Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 233 P.2d 699 (Utah 1951) 1, 8, 13 
Nelms v. Gardner, 386 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1967) 10 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982) 18, 19 
Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 3,4, 5, 18, 19,20, 21 
Pollard v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 890 (W.D.Mo. 1967) 11 
Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1966) 10 
Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981) 14, 15 
Williams v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 230 P.2d 315 (Utah 1951) 1, 8, 13 
i i i 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50 18 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 18 
iv 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Denial of Mr. Lyon's Motion for New Trial Should Be Reversed 
A trial court has no discretion to uphold a jury verdict that is unsupported by the 
evidence presented at trial. See Brown v. Johnson. All P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1970). 
Further, a trial court evaluating whether a verdict is supported by the evidence has no 
discretion to weigh the credibility of a witness absent record evidence that the witness's 
credibility actually was called into question at trial. See Chatelain v. Thackeray. 100 P.2d 
19L 198 (Utah 1940). Moreover, a key aspect of determining whether a verdict is 
supported by evidence is the assumption that the jury followed the jury instructions in 
arriving at its verdict. See, e.g., Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G. W.R. Co.. 233 P.2d 699, 
700 (Utah 1951): Williams v. Ogden Union Rv. & Depot Co.. 230 P.2d 315, 322 (Utah 
1951). A jury's disregard of either the evidence or the instructions, or both, is grounds 
for a new trial. Chatelain. 100 P.2d at 198. 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant Mr. Lyon's 
motion for new trial by ignoring the clear and uncontroverted evidence presented in Mr. 
Lyon's favor on the question of causation and instead engaging in speculation concerning 
how the jury reached its verdict. Additionally, the trial court repeatedly improperly 
assumed, or at least made conclusions that logically required the assumption, that the jury 
had ignored the jury instructions in reaching its verdict. Nearly all of defendant-appellee 
Dr. Bryan's1 arguments in support of the denial of the motion for new trial similarly ask 
before going farther, Mr. Lyon's counsel must note that it has come to their 
attention that Dr. Bryan was referred to as "Dr. Lyon" on portions of pages 3 and 4 of the 
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this Court to uphold the verdict based on improper assumptions that the jury ignored the 
jury instructions. 
A. Dr. Bryan's Suggestion that a plaintiff Cannot Prevail on an Appeal 
of a Trial Court Denial of a Motion for New Trial Due to Insufficiency 
of the Evidence Has No Basis in Utah Law 
Dr. Bryan cites Missouri case law for the proposition that a trial court's denial of a 
motion for new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict 
should never be overturned on appeal if the motion was brought by the party bearing the 
burden of proof. Dr. Bryan admits that Missouri law has no application here but argues 
that "that it is important to acknowledge that given the proof burden, the verdict in this 
case is properly understood as a finding of 'not proven9 It did not matter whether 
appellee Dr. Bryan introduced any evidence [on the element of causation], because he had 
no obligation to do so." (Brief of Appellee at p. 20.) This argument fails because it 
ignores that the proper test in Utah for determining whether a new trial should be granted 
is an evaluation of the evidence regardless of which party brings the motion. In this case, 
the evidence clearly preponderated in favor of Mr. Lyon, and the verdict could only be 
justified by speculating as to why the jury may have ignored that clear and uncontroverted 
evidence. 
B. Dr. Bryan Does Not Point to Any Evidence Supporting the Jury 
Verdict; His Argument Is Limited to a Defense of the Trial 
Court's Improper Speculation 
Dr. Bryan concedes that the trial court engaged in speculation in denying Mr. 
Brief of Appellant. Mr. Lyon's counsel apologize for this error and for any confusion or 
inconvenience it caused this Court or Dr. Bryan's counsel. 
2 
Lyon's motion for new trial. Rather than attempt to point to any evidence that supports 
the jury verdict, Dr. Bryan devotes essentially his entire argument to attempting to justify 
the trial court's improper speculation. He argues that the speculation "honored" the 
presumption of the verdict's validity and that a trial court has little option but to engage in 
such speculation in order to honor that presumption. The case of Ortiz v. Geneva Rock 
Prods., Inc.. 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), illustrates the fallacy of his argument. 
Dr. Bryan likely will complain about reliance on Ortiz in this context because Ortiz 
was a direct appellate review of a jury verdict rather than a review of a trial court's denial 
of a motion for new trial. That distinction, however, is a hollow one for present purposes. 
Ortiz contains guidance on at least three points that should be considered regardless of 
which of the two contexts is before this Court. 
First, Ortiz makes clear that, while entitled to great respect, jury verdicts are not 
sacrosanct and must be overturned if unsupported by the evidence. 939P.2dat 1216; see 
also Hvlandv. St. Mark's Hosp.. All P.2d 736. 738 (Utah 1967). Second, Ortiz sets forth 
the standard for determining when a jury verdict is not supported by the evidence. See 
939P.2d at 1216. This standard is essentially that applied in reviews of motions for new 
trial. Cf Brown, All P.2d at 944. Third, Ortiz makes clear that a court should not 
speculate as to how a verdict may have been reached but rather must confine itself to 
evaluating the evidence actually presented and whether that evidence supported the 
verdict. See Ortiz. 939 P.2d at 1218. n.4. In light of what Ortiz taught on this third point, 
the trial court in the present case undeniably engaged in improper speculation. 
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In Ortiz, this Court was faced with an appeal from a jury verdict that clearly was 
based on insufficient evidence, and reversed that verdict as a result. Ortiz, like the 
present case, was a negligence action, but differed in that comparative negligence was 
tried. 939 P.2dat 1216-18. The jury had returned a verdict of no cause of action, i.e.,. 
that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence whatsoever. Id. at 1216. Three 
witnesses had provided testimony that the defendant had been negligent to a degree, 
which did not support the verdict. Id. at 1217. The Ortiz defendant could point to only 
one witness who it claimed had provided testimony that supported the verdict. This Court 
concluded that witness's testimony did not, in fact, provide support for the finding of no 
negligence. Id, In short, the uncontroverted evidence presented to the Ortiz jury did not 
support the jury's verdict. 
The Ortiz defendant also argued that the verdict should stand because of evidence 
that the plaintiff had been negligent, although the jury had not reached the question 
regarding comparative negligence on the verdict form. Id. at 1218, n.3. This Court 
admitted that it appeared "possible the jury actually may have found [the plaintiff] was 
more negligent than [the defendant], but marked no negligence on the special verdict 
form." Id at n.4 (emphasis added). This Court, however, refused to rely on this 
possibility to uphold the verdict. Id. at 1216. 1218. Instead, this Court focused 
exclusively on whether evidence actually presented at trial supported the verdict actually 
rendered. Id. at 1218. The lesson is clear - the evidence is the key to determining 
whether a verdict is based on sufficient evidence. The temptation to reason backward 
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and find a possible justification for a verdict that clearly is unsupported by the evidence 
must be avoided. 
Dr. Bryan attempts to justify the trial court's speculation in the present case by 
arguing that the trial court was in a position of special advantage in that it actually 
observed the testimony and evidence presented at trial. This argument might have some 
teeth in a case where a new trial was sought from a verdict based on conflicting evidence. 
But that is not the case here. Here, the trial court acknowledged that clear, 
uncontroverted evidence was presented in support of Mr. Lyon on the issue of causation. 
(R. 000539, attached as Addendum Tab C to the Brief of Appellant.) Instead of 
granting a new trial, however, the court upheld the verdict on the basis that there were 
various "possibilities" as to how the jury had come to ignore that evidence and come to a 
contrary determination. (R. 000537-541, attached at Addendum Tab C to the Brief of 
Appellant.) This is precisely the type of backwards justification rejected by Ortiz. 
Dr. Bryan also argues that the speculation in which the trial court engaged is 
"inherent" to deciding a motion for new trial, and therefore "expected." He does not cite 
any authority for that proposition, nor does he point to any examples of trial courts 
engaging in this "inherent," "expected" speculation. He cannot do so. The cases are clear 
that the test for determining whether a new trial should be granted is whether the verdict 
is supported by the evidence. Where the verdict is not so supported, the verdict must be 
overturned. Brown. 472 P.2d at 944. The test is not whether some possibility might be 
construed to justify a verdict notwithstanding the evidence. The trial court's analysis 
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should have ended when it concluded that Mr. Lyon had presented uncontroverted 
evidence in support of his position and contrary to the jury's verdict. Instead, the trial 
court took it upon itself to take the inquiry in a new, and improper, direction by 
speculating how the jury had reached its verdict. 
For example, the trial court reasoned that the "jury may have concluded that 
Plaintiff failed to carry his burden" in proving causation because the evidence presented 
on causation was "very brief." (R. 000539) (emphasis added). That the trial court was 
concerned with what the jury "may have" thought, rather that what the evidence was, 
demonstrates that this was a speculative exercise rather than an objective review of the 
evidence. 
The trial court went on to reason that "[i]t is entirely possible, and reasonable, that 
the jury may have simply found Dr. Serfiistini's testimony not credible or at least 
unpersuasive" because he only answered the plaintiffs counsel's question regarding 
causation "clearly" when that question was rephrased. (R. 000539, attached as 
Addendum Tab C to Brief of Appellant.) (emphasis added). Again, this is nothing more 
than speculation regarding the jury's refusal to accept what the trial court acknowledges to 
have been clear and uncontroverted testimony. The court may as well have speculated that 
the jury simply might not have been listening when the causation evidence was presented, 
or might not have heard Dr. Serfustini, or might have suffered from collective amnesia. 
All such speculations are equally invalid. Uncontroverted evidence was presented in Mr. 
Lyon's favor on the issue of causation at trial, and therefore the jury's verdict of no 
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causation is unsupported by the evidence. 
C. Dr. Serfustini's Testimony Is Not the Sort of 
Incontroverted Testimony that Simply Can Be Disbelieved 
Dr. Bryan also attempts to support the trial court's decision by pointing out that, in 
some circumstances, a finder of fact is free to disbelieve uncontroverted testimony. He 
fails, however, to point to any authority permitting a jury to simply disregard 
uncontroverted expert opinion. He also fails to explain how the jury could have both 
complied with the jury instructions and disregarded Dr. Serfustini's opinion regarding 
causation. 
1. The Homer and Glauser Cases Cited by Dr. Bryan Are 
Readily Distinguishable and Inapplicable 
Dr. Bryan points to two cases he claims support the position that the jury was free 
to simply disregard Dr. Serfustini's testimony, Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), and Glauser Storage. L.L.C v. Smedlev. 2001 UT App 141. 27 P.3d 565. 
Neither of those cases is applicable here. 
Homer involved a dispute over use of a piece of land and whether that use entitled 
the plaintiff in that case to a prescriptive easement. 866 P.2d at 624-26. The trial judge in 
Homer, sitting at a bench trial, disregarded certain testimony of two fact witnesses who 
testified that the predecessors in interest to the plaintiff had permission to cross the land 
during their lifetimes. Id. at 627. "This testimony was uncontroverted because the 
[predecessors in interest] were no longer alive at the time of trial." Id, The trial court 
expressly stated in its written findings of fact that the "testimony concerning the 
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[predecessors in interest] was ' self-serving and not believable in view of [the fact 
witnesses'] conduct, demeanor and substantive testimony during trial.'" IcL Furthermore, 
the testimony of the two fact witnesses in question "was contradictory and inconsistent" 
throughout the trial. IdL_ Like Homer, Glauser was tried to the bench rather than to a jury, 
and the trial court expressly set forth the reasons it found the subject fact witness's 
testimony unpersuasive in written findings of fact. 2001 UT App at ^ fl[ 11. 24-27. 
The present case differs materially from both Homer and Glauser. First, unlike 
those cases, the present matter involves a jury trial. Therefore, in this case the trial judge 
was not the finder of fact. As a result, there are no written findings of fact. Second, 
unlike Homer, this case does not involve a situation where the relevant witness's 
testimony was only uncontroverted because there was no living witness available to 
controvert it. The defendant had his own medical expert, Dr. Vanderhooft, who 
presumably would have controverted Dr. Serfiistini's testimony on causation had he been 
able. Third, both Homer and Glauser dealt with fact, rather than expert witnesses. As a 
matter of law and as the jury was instructed, uncontroverted expert testimony may only be 
wholly disregarded under certain circumstances, none of which were met in this case. 
2. The Jury Could Not Have Disregarded Dr. Serfiistini's 
Testimony and Obeyed the Jury Instructions 
As a matter of law, it should be assumed that the jury followed the trial court's 
instructions in evaluating the evidence and applying the law. Kirchgestner* 223 P.2d at 
700: Williams. 230 P.2d at 322. If it appears the jury did not follow the jury instructions, 
however, and as a result reached a verdict that was contrary to the evidence, then that 
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verdict must be set aside. Chatelain. 100 P.2d at 198. Therefore, Dr. Bryan has little 
choice but to argue that the jury followed the instructions, and does so. The difficulty Dr. 
Bryan faces in making that argument is that the reasoning of the trial court in 
upholding the verdict tacitly requires an assumption that the jury did not follow the 
instructions. 
The trial court reasoned that the jury "may have" simply disregarded Dr. 
Serfustini's uncontroverted opinion regarding causation on the grounds that the opinion 
was brief and that Mr. Lyon's counsel asked a follow-up question to clarify that opinion. 
Neither of those reasons, however, would have provided the jury with grounds to entirely 
disregard Dr. Serfustini's opinion and find that the Dr. Bryan's negligence did not cause 
injury to Mr. Lyon. 
Jury Instruction No. 15 stated: 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a 
witness to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the 
case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by education, study and 
experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, 
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as 
an expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You should 
consider expert opinion and the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not 
bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves. If you 
decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the 
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that such 
opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the 
opinion entirely. 
(R.000355, attached at Addendum Tab 3 to the Brief of Appellee.) (emphasis added.) 
This instruction plainly limited the jury's discretion to entirely disregard an expert 
witness's opinion to one of three circumstances: (1) lack of sufficient education and 
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experience; (2) unsound reasoning by the expert; or (3) other evidence outweighing the 
opinion. 
Dr. Bryan argues, as he must, that the jury was not so limited. First, he argues that 
"[njeither precedent nor logic supports such restriction in expert opinion instruction." 
(Brief of Appellee at p. 21.) Second, he argues that Mr. Lyon's position improperly 
elevates the jury instruction concerning consideration of expert opinion above the other 
jury instructions. Third, he argues that the trial court correctly construed that jury 
instruction as setting forth a "non-exhaustive list" of circumstances where it would be 
appropriate for the jury to entirely disregard expert opinion. Each of those arguments fails 
for the reasons below. 
Dr. Bryan's first argument, his appeal to precedent and logic, is noteworthy because 
he neither supplies any precedent nor explains his "logic." He cannot. There is no 
precedent in support of his position; the rule is to the contrary. Further, the reasoning of 
courts that have applied the rule illustrate the logic in limiting the discretion of a fact 
finder to simply disregard expert opinion. 
In the case of Berven v. Gardner. 414 F.2d 857 C8th Cir. 19691 the 8th Circuit 
recognized that "a finding contrary to uncontroverted expert opinion should be set aside as 
being conjectural and not supported by substantial evidence and speculative." 414F.2d at 
861. Dr. Bryan attempts to distinguish Berven on the grounds that it was a summary 
judgment case decided without a jury. The reasoning of Berven and the cases cited by it,2 
2See Nelms v. Gardner. 386 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1967): Combs v. Gardner. 382 F.2d 
949 (6th Cir. 1967): Ross v. Gardner. 365 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1966): Celebrezze v. 
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however, applies equally in a jury proceeding. Those courts5 reasoning boils down to this: 
a finder of fact, be it a judge or a jury, is in no position to place itself in the position of an 
expert such as a doctor and determine that an uncontroverted opinion of another expert 
based on education and experience is wrong absent some direct evidential attack on the 
expert's credentials or the opinion itself. The logic behind this reasoning is simple: 
allowing fact finders to simply ignore uncontroverted learned opinions in medicine,, 
engineering and similar fields in which the fact finder has no expertise would lead to 
absurd results based on the fact finder's uneducated conjecture and speculation. A litigant 
who submits his or her case to a jury certainly turns the determination of the facts of the 
case over to that jury, but doing so does not provide the jury the power to ignore or rewrite 
medical science or the laws of physics. Therefore, juries are instructed that they may only 
entirely ignore such opinions under certain circumstances. Neither the trial court nor Dr. 
Bryan points out where any of those circumstances were met in this case. 
Dr. Bryan's second argument fails because Mr. Lyon's position clearly does not 
"elevate" Instruction No. 15 above the other instructions. Rather, Mr. Lyon's position puts 
Instruction No. 15 on equal footing with the other instructions. It should be noted that 
Instruction No. 15 is the only instruction that deals directly and exclusively with expert 
opinion testimony. Dr. Bryan would have this Court ignore Instruction No. 15 and its 
plain language. 
Dr. Bryan's third argument fails because the proper grounds for entirely 
Warren. 339 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1964); Pollard v. Gardner. 267 F. Supp. 890 fW.D.Mo. 
1967V 
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disregarding expert testimony provided by Instruction No. 15 are exclusive, as evidenced 
by the plain language of the instruction. There is no language in the body of the 
instruction that even suggests otherwise - no "such as", no "including," no "for example." 
The instruction lists only three grounds. Dr. Bryan points to no authority that supports the 
trial court's characterization that the grounds listed by instruction are "non-exclusive.", 
Nor does he can offer any explanation as to how the jury could read the grounds as non-
exclusive in light of the plain language of the instruction. 
Additionally, the trial court's determination that the jury "may have" found Dr. 
Serfustini to be unpersuasive ignores an important reality of this case. The jury must have 
found Dr. Serfustini credible and persuasive on the hotly contested issue of negligence in 
order to find in the plaintiffs favor on that issue. Dr. Serfustini was the only witness who 
testified that Dr. Bryan's failure to treat and diagnose Mr. Lyon was a violation of the 
medical standard of care. Even were it proper to make assumptions regarding the jury's 
evaluation of the evidence, and it is not, it makes no sense to assume that the jury simply 
concluded that Mr. Lyon's medical expert lacked credibility or was unpersuasive on an 
uncontroverted point where it is clear the jury accepted that same expert's testimony on a 
furiously contested point. 
D. The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion for New Trial Should Not 
Be Upheld on the Theory that the Jury Based Its Verdict of 
Negligence on Some Speculative "Alternative Basis" 
Dr. Bryan's argument that the jury may have found him to have been negligent on 
the basis of his note-keeping, rather than on the basis of his failure to diagnose and treat 
Mr. Lyon's blood clots, should be rejected for at least two reasons. First, concluding that 
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the jury determined that Dr. Bryan was negligent on any other basis than his failure to 
diagnose and treat Mr. Lyon requires assuming that the jury ignored the jury instructions. 
If the jury did ignore the jury instructions, then a new trial should be granted on that basis. 
Second, the record does not support this "theory." 
L If the Jury Found Dr. Bryan Negligent on Some Basis Other than 
His Failure to Diagnose and Treat Mr. Lyon, then It Ignored the 
Jury Instructions 
Again, as a matter of law, it should be assumed that the jury understood and 
complied with the jury instructions in reaching its verdict. Kirchgestner* 233 P.2d at 700: 
Williams. 230 P.2d at 322. Here, the jury instructions expressly informed the jury: 
[t]he Plaintiff claims that on November 15, 2005, Dr. Bryan performed 
surgery on Mr. Lyon's left shoulder (rotator cuff) at McKay-Dee Hospital 
and that on November 28, 2005, Dr. Bryan negligently failed to diagnose 
and treat blood clots in his arm, causing injury and damage. The 
Defendant Dr. Bryan has denied that he was negligent in the medical care 
rendered to Mr. Lyon and that his care was the cause of his alleged injury 
and damage. 
(R. 000336, attached at Addendum Tab 3 to the Brief of Appellee.) (emphasis added.) 
Dr. Bryan acknowledges that this instruction was given, but protests that it only was given 
once, prior to the presentation of evidence. That argument fails because upholding the 
denial of the motion for new trial on based on that very argument would also require an 
assumption that the jury ignored the jury instructions. 
The jury expressly was instructed in Instruction 7 A that the order of the instructions 
and the number of instructions on any given topic had no significance: 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must 
consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their relative importance. If a direction or an 
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idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis is intended 
and none must be inferred by you. 
(R. 000347, attached at Addendum Tab 3 to the Brief of Appellee.) Dr. Bryan's 
implication that the jury may simply have forgotten the basis of negligence at issue 
because the instruction was given prior to the presentation of evidence is also belied by 
Instruction 7 A, which stated, "You will take these instructions with you into the jury room 
for further reference." (Id.) (emphasis added.) 
Dr. Bryan also argues that other, "non-specific" instructions concerning negligence 
were given that"invited" the jury to find negligence on some basis other than the one it 
was expressly instructed to consider. This is just another form of the same argument - Dr. 
Bryan cannot get around the fact that the instruction concerning the nature of the 
negligence at issue was given, that the jury was instructed to consider all of the 
instructions, and that the law requires the assumption that the jury understood and 
followed all of the instructions. As a matter of law, it must be assumed that the jury 
received and understood the instruction regarding the negligence at issue. Therefore, it 
must be assumed that the jury understood the basis for the claim of negligence it was 
called upon to decide. 
Dr. Bryan's citation of Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care. 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 
1981). adds nothing to his argument. Nothing in Schmidt suggests that the jury m that case 
expressly was instructed as to the basis of the alleged negligence. See 635 P.2d at 99-102. 
Additionally, the lack of clarity regarding the basis of the finding of negligence in Schmidt 
was not the reason the Schmidt jury's verdict was upheld. The basis for that decision was 
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that "[t]here was clearly a conflict in the testimony" concerning the causation of the 
plaintiffs injuries, and "[s]ince reasonable minds could have found as the jury did based 
on the evidence before it," it could not be said that the trial court had abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant a new trial. Id. at 101. The Schmidt court's mention of the lack of 
clarity as to the basis of negligence came in response to a separate contention by the 
plaintiff that any jury's "finding of negligence with no finding of proximate cause" is 
unlawful and inconsistent as a matter of law. See i± In other words, the Schmidt plaintiff 
argued on appeal that all jury determinations that find a defendant negligent but that the 
negligence was not a proximate cause of injury must be reversed as a matter of law. No 
such contention is before this Court. 
As discussed above and in the Brief of Appellant, Dr. Bryan's arguments in support 
of the jury verdict, and especially in support of the notion that the jury arrived at a finding 
of negligence on some basis other than Dr. Bryan's negligence in failing to diagnose and 
treat Mr. Lyon, require the assumption that the jury ignored or disobeyed the jury 
instructions. If Dr. Bryan's arguments are accepted, then Mr. Lyon is entitled to a new 
trial as a matter of law. See Chatelain. 100 P.2d at 198. 
2. The Record Does Not Support Dr. Bryan's Theory that the 
Finding of Negligence Was Based on Something Other than Dr. 
Bryan's Failure to Diagnose and Treat Mr. Lyon 
Dr. Bryan's theory, which was adopted by the trial court, is that the jury's finding 
of negligence might have been based on argument concerning notes that counsel for Mr. 
Lyon characterized as "phony" to the jury during closing argument. This theory is 
unsupported by the record. Furthermore, upholding the verdict on this theory would, once 
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again, require this Court to assume that the jury ignored the trial court's instructions. 
It goes almost without saying that closing argument is not evidence. Therefore, it 
would be inappropriate to uphold the jury verdict and the trial court's denial of new trial 
based merely on a closing argument. Furthermore, the jury was expressly instructed that 
closing argument is not evidence. (R. 000199.) Moreover, Mr. Lyon's counsel reminded 
the jury of this instruction during his argument. (R. 000626 at p. 89.) 
Dr. Bryan concedes that, as a matter of law, argument is not evidence, but argues 
that the rule that argument is not evidence ignores the "reality" that juries are persuaded by 
closing arguments. This appeal to "reality" is an invitation to ignore the law by upholding 
the jury verdict on a basis that requires assuming the jury ignored the court's instructions. 
Additionally, there is nothing in the portions of the closing argument cited by Dr. 
Bryan that supports his theory. Evidence regarding Dr. Bryan's notes was presented to 
attack Dr. Bryan's credibility and the opinions of Dr. Vanderhooft, which were based on 
those notes. This was explained to the jury during the closing argument of Mr. Lyon's 
counsel. (R. 000626, at pp. 94-95, 104-05.) Dr. Bryan argues that the closing argument 
does not "clearly conveyf] the idea that the inaccuracy of [his] 'informed consent' notes 
impeaches the credibility of his other clinical notes - or of his trial testimony.'" Even were 
this true, and an objective reading of those portions will reveal it is not, there is nothing in 
those portions of the closing argument that supports the notion that the jury somehow 
understood the closing argument of Mr. Lyon's counsel to convey that Dr. Bryan's note-
taking or note-keeping was evidence of negligence. Acceptance of that theory requires 
pure speculation, which clearly is an improper basis for denial of a new trial. 
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II. This Court is Free to Independently Review the Jury's Verdict 
Dr. Bryan argues that, because Mr. Lyon filed a motion for new trial, this Court is 
precluded from conducting an independent review of the jury's verdict and is limited to 
merely reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion. Dr. Bryan does not provide a shred 
of authority for that proposition. This Court is free to conduct an independent review of 
the evidence and the jury verdict, and should grant a new trial based on that review for the 
reasons set forth in Section I of the Argument portion of the Brief of Appellant. 
A. An Independent Review of the Verdict Would Not "Disrespect" the 
Trial Court 
Dr. Bryan does not point to a single case where an appellate court refused to review 
a jury verdict because the trial court had ruled on a motion for new trial. Rather, he claims 
that an independent review of the trial court's "conscientious effort... to carefully 
consider all of the evidence, as well as the parties' arguments, related to the new trial 
motion" would "disrespect" the trial court. Even were this true in some cases, it clearly is 
not true in this case. 
A trial court faced with a motion for new trial based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence is charged with determining whether sufficient evidence supported the verdict. 
See King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987V Here, the trial court reviewed the 
evidence and determined that the testimony regarding causation in this case was presented 
in favor of plaintiff and was uncontroverted (R. 000538, 000539, attached to the Brief of 
Appellant at Addendum Tab C ) Instead of confining its analysis to the review of the 
evidence of the evidence presented at trial, however, the trial court proceeded to engage in 
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rank speculation as to how the jury "may have" reached its verdict. The court settled on 
four avenues through which the jury "may have" reached the verdict, none of which were 
supported by the uncontroverted evidence, and at least three of which tacitly assumed that 
the jury had ignored jury instructions. (See Brief of Appellant at pp. 26-36.) The ruling is 
clearly an abuse of the trial court's discretion and, therefore, not entitled to any deference. 
If this Court does consider itself to be limited to a review of the denial of the motion for 
new trial, the outcome of this appeal should be summary reversal of that decision for the 
reasons set forth above. 
B. There Is No Procedural Bar to an Independent Review of the Verdict 
Dr. Bryan argues that Mr. Lyon did not preserve direct review of the jury verdict 
because Mr. Lyon did not make a motion for directed verdict at trial and a post-trial 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Amazingly, Dr. Bryan makes this 
argument even though he concedes that the plaintiff-appellant in the Ortiz case obtained 
the reversal of a jury verdict without filing either a motion for directed verdict or a motion 
for new trial. (See Brief of Appellee, at p. 35.) 
Dr. Bryan does not point to any authority in support of his position; his argument 
merely notes similarities between the standard for grant of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and language used in the Brief of Appellant. A motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial, however, clearly are not 
synonymous - they are separate motions authorized by separate rules that seek separate 
relief. See Utah Rs.Civ.P. 50, 59. 
Dr. Bryan's argument is further belied by cases such as Nelson v. Trujillo* 657 P.2d 
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730 (Utah 1982). because such cases make clear that motions for new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence can be brought and granted in circumstances where moving 
for directed verdict would be inappropriate. In Nelson, a motion for new trial based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict was brought by the plaintiff, granted and 
affirmed even though there clearly was substantial evidence supporting the verdict See 
657*P.2d-at 732. In such a case, it would be at best an empty formality, and possibly bad 
faith, for the plaintiff to bring a motion for directed verdict at trial. 
C. Ortiz Is Directly on Point and Dispositive of this Appeal 
Dr. Bryan desperately seeks to have this Court distinguish the Ortiz case, 939 P.2d 
1213. for a simple reason. Ortiz teaches that, where a plaintiff appeals a jury verdict and 
demonstrates that the verdict is not supported by uncontroverted evidence presented at 
trial, the verdict must be overturned and a new tiial granted There is no dispute that the 
uncontroverted evidence presented at trial in this matter on the issue of causation does not 
support the verdict of no causation. Under Ortiz, then, the jury verdict should be 
overturned and Mr. Lyon should be granted a new trial. 
Dr. Bryan attacks Mr. Lyon's reliance on Ortiz on two grounds. First, he claims 
that Ortiz was procedurally distinguishable from the present matter because "there is no 
indication that the [Ortiz] trial court , . . was ever presented with a post-verdict motion for 
new trial; rather, judgment was entered on the verdict, and the appeal followed/' Second, 
he argues that the present case differs substantively from Ortiz in that Mr. Lyon points 
only to the uncontroverted testimony of one witness in his favor, while the Ortiz plaintiff 
could point to three witnesses. Neither of those arguments presents any meaningful 
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distinction. 
Dr. Bryan's procedural argument is perplexing in light of his argument that Mr. 
Lyon failed to preserve independent review of the jury verdict. As discussed above, Dr. 
Bryan admits that "[ i ] t . . . appears in Ortiz [ that ] . . . no directed verdict was sought by 
either party." That begs the question: if the Ortiz plaintiff neither moved for a new trial 
nor moved for a directed verdict, how did the Ortiz plaintiff preserve review of the jury 
verdict for appeal? Dr. Bryan alludes to two possibilities. 
On the one hand, Dr. Bryan abandons his own argument that an independent review 
of a jury verdict requires the appellant to have made a motion for directed verdict at trial. 
Instead, he concedes that simply obtaining a jury verdict may be sufficient to preserve 
review of the verdict for appeal, which Ortiz implies. His attempt at drawing a distinction 
between the present case and Ortiz is an unsupported suggestion that a party who takes the 
additional step of making a motion for new trial is, for some unexplained reason, limited 
to only a review of the denial of that motion in the event it is denied. 
On the other hand, Dr. Bryan suggests that the Ortiz defendant failed to raise 
procedural issues with the plaintiffs appeal, and that the outcome of the Ortiz appeal 
might have been different had such issues been raise. By his own admission, however, 
nothing in Ortiz suggests there were any procedural defects, much less how this Court 
would have ruled had any been raised. Ortiz clearly cannot be distinguished from the 
present case on the basis of imaginary procedural defects and rulings. 
Dr. Bryan's argument that Ortiz differs substantively from the present case is 
correct in one respect. The Ortiz defendant could point to one witness who it could at least 
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argue had presented evidence in support of the jury verdict. See Ortiz. 939 P.2d at 1217-
18. Dr. Bryan has not, and cannot, point to any such witness. The uncontroverted 
evidence presented at trial clearly preponderates against the jury's verdict and against his 
position on appeal. Instead, throughout his argument, he repeatedly asks this Court to do 
what it would not in Ortiz: uphold a jury verdict on the basis of mere possibilities. See id. 
at 1218; n.4. Doing so in this case would be every bit as improper as it would have been in 
Ortiz. Therefore, the verdict must be overturned and a new trial granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the Brief of Appellant, the jury verdict should 
be set aside and a new trial granted. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2011. 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
Scott Savage 
Kyle C. Thompson 
Attorneys for Appellant John A. Lyon 
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